Secession and Terrorism

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I mentioned that I was knee-deep in homework the last time I posted. Now, after two weeks of reading up on stuff that I missed due to being absent for lectures, I finished one of the assignment and figured that it would make for an interesting blog entry. As we all know, the Sri Lankan blogosphere is rife in conversations about the ethnic tensions in the country, the impending war (is it impending or is it ongoing?), solutions, and even conspiracies. What better place, then, to ask feedback on my own assignment, which concerns secession, self-determination and terrorism in the Sri Lankan context?

Here it is then. The assignment asked to consider the consequences of the demands for secession merging with terror, with special reference to Sri Lanka. What I am looking for is constructive feedback on the assignment plus discussion on the points I have put forward. It will be interesting to see how people from different shades of the politicial spectrum interpret my work.

I’ve uploaded the assignment in word format for those who find the rendering on WordPress to be painful to their eyes. For others, the assignment in its entirety is available below:

Secession movements aim to restrict the judiciary powers of the state over a group and the territory they occupy. History has shown that secession claims can metamorphose into terrorism movements – the Basque separatist movement in Spain, for instance, was synonymous with Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) ¹; similarly, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has its roots in Tamil autonomy movements in post-independence Sri Lanka.

 

This paper concerns the latter. It aims to trace the historical declarations of autonomy by Tamil fundamentalist movements in Sri Lanka, including pointing out the juncture at which the secession claims morphed into terrorism movements, before describing the costs – in a social, legal and human rights point of view - that have resulted since.

History of Tamil Secession Movements in Sri Lanka

· Ethnicity and Nationalism in Post-Independent Sri Lanka

Tamil separatism is entwined with the island’s traumatic post-independence policies. Following independence, nationalism came to the fore in Sri Lankan politics and was dealt with by the mature statesmanship of the time. The first prime minister of Sri Lanka, D S Senanayake, saw Sri Lanka’s ethnic diversity as a source of strength, not a weakness, and viewed it as the core of a Sri Lankan nationalism. Therefore, his policies as prime minister were based on the recognition and nurturing of pluralism ².

Unlike in pre-partition India, where religion was at the centre of Hindu and Islamic nationalist movements, Sri Lanka experienced nationalism that was two-forked: on one hand there was Buddhism –Theravada Buddhism to be exact – which was a source of national pride; on the other, the sense of ethnic distinctiveness was accentuated by their unique language – Sinhala ². From 1954, these two forces began to assert their will on Sri Lankan policy, culminating in S W R D Bandaranaike’s election victory in 1956. His election platform - to tap into the discontent felt by the majority Sinhalese Buddhists – was very potent when viewed against the background of the Buddha Jayanthi (The 2500^th death anniversary of Lord Buddha) celebrations in the same year.

However, the Sinhala language, and the importance afforded to it by nationalist movements at the time, became the most central issue of polity; in the words of Professor K M De Silva, executive director of International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), nationalism had become linguistic nationalism ⁴.

· Linguist Nationalism and ‘Sinhala Only’

Bandaranaike’s party, the Mahajana Eksath Perumumna (MEP), came to power with a ‘Sinhala only’ policy. Although this was deemed purely rhetoric initially, it quickly made its way through the legislature, culminating in its introduction as the Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956.

At the polar opposite of this ideology was the Marxist Left Party, which advocated a ‘Parity of status’ for both Sinhala and Tamil languages. Parity of status was defined as one giving equal status to both languages – bi-lingualism – throughout the country. One of the key proponents of bi-lingualism in the Tamil community was S Nadesan, a lawyer/politician, who defined it thus ⁶:

[it] implies that every single public officer in this country should have an adequate knowledge of both languages so that he may be able to take up employment in any part of the island, and that all citizens should have equal opportunities for entering the Public Service.

To enable this to be done the necessary changes must be made to the education system so that those who aspire to the Public Service may acquire an adequate knowledge of both official languages. It is not necessary for those who do not desire to join the public services to learn both languages.

In addition, he linked bi-lingualism to a federal or quasi-federal political structure ⁵, comparing Sri Lanka’s political setup to other federal states such as Belgium and Switzerland. It can be stated that this was the one of the first instances of Tamil secession being brought to attention in the political sphere, and, thereby, Nadesan, being one of the founding fathers of this movement.

· Secessionism in Sri Lanka

In August 1956, the Federal Party stated the demands on behalf of the Tamil people. Chief amongst these demands was autonomy for the Northern and Eastern provinces under a federal constitution.

The reaction of the ruling party and Bandaranaike himself were very different; where the extremists in the MEP sought to maintain pressure on the Tamils, Bandaranaike chose to negotiate.

The results of this negotiation (which came to light in July 1957), popularly known as the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact, went beyond recognising the Federal Party as the representatives of the Tamil people and making concessions with regard to the language policy. Instead, Bandaranaike agreed t o limit settlement of Sinhalese communities in the Northern and Eastern provinces, thereby maintaining the status quo of the Tamils as the majority in these areas. In effect, he had linked language policy to devolution of power ⁷.

News of the pact was met with fierce resistance, and the resulting tensions finally came to head in the race riots of May 1958. It can be argued that these riots and subsequent ethnic riots of the 60s and 70s brought gave rise to terrorism movements, including the LTTE, that have come to be synonymous with the Tamil secession movements in Sri Lanka.

The Convergence of Secession and Terrorism

· The Legal Basis for Secession and Terrorism

The rise to power of the LTTE and their claim to be “the sole representative of the Tamil people” has prompted questions over distinguishing between terrorism and secession. For instance, Taiwan’s claim to be ‘free’ from communist China can’t be viewed as a terrorism movement when it is simply a desire for secession. The Palestinian struggle, on the other hand, benefits from a certain sense of legitimacy, in the eyes of international law, only for this legitimacy to be diluted due to the methods used in securing their homeland. To draw the line, an understanding of how international law views both phenomena is required.

Secession movements have at their core the principle of self-determination. This principle entails… “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”.⁸ Furthermore, UN Resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960 stated its “conviction that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory, and that, by virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. ⁹

Terrorism on the other hand has little validity in the eyes of international law. With the notable exceptions of Taliban-era Afghanistan, Iran and Libya, terrorism is a phenomenon that finds little acceptance in the eyes of the international community. Terrorist organizations, therefore, use the aforementioned principles of self-determination, enshrined in the UN Charter, to justify their case for secession and, in cases such as Sri Lanka, armed struggle.

· The Convergence of Secession and Terrorism: Costs Borne by Sri Lanka

As conflicts in any area of the world have shown, the costs borne by both sides, particularly by civilians, are immense. The ongoing conflicts in Sri Lanka have resulted in incalculable costs to its development.

These costs, when analyzed from a human rights point of view, include:

1. Massacres ¹⁰

2. Assassinations

3. Abductions and torture by both sides ¹⁰

4. Recruitment of child soldiers ¹¹

5. Use of landmines ¹²

6. Internally Displaced People (IDPs) ¹³

7. Refugees ¹⁴

8. Media freedom

All of the above stated costs will need to be seen in conjunction with financial costs to get a clearer picture of the full impact on Sri Lankan society. For instance, defence spending has taken the bulk of Sri Lanka’s annual budgets. The opportunity costs of spending on defence – money that could have gone for spending on health care, infrastructure development, and, most importantly, educational reforms – have combined to slow down its progress.

Appendix

¹⁰ 64,000 people were killed during the two decade conflict

¹¹ Child soldiers recruited

 

	Recruits	Average age
2002	1,466	14
2003	1,214	15
2004	823	16
2005	543	16

(Source: UNICEF)

12 Civilian landmine casualties

 

	Killed	Injured	Total
2002	27	127	154
2003	25	85	110
2004	17	39	56
2005	4	26	30
Total	73	277	350

(Source: UNDP)

¹³ 800,000 were displaced

¹⁴ 200,000 refugees in southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu

Footnotes

¹ The ETA declared a permanent ceasefire on March 22, 2006. (2006), ETA Ceasefire Statement, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4833490.stm, Accessed on 29 June 2006

² De Silva, K M, (1998), Reaping the Whirlwind (1^st Edition), 22-24, New Delhi: Penguin Books India

³ De Silva, K M, (1998), Reaping the Whirlwind (1^st Edition), 8-9, New Delhi: Penguin Books India

⁴ De Silva, K M, (1998), Reaping the Whirlwind (1^st Edition), 25, New Delhi: Penguin Books India

⁵ De Silva, K M, (1998), Reaping the Whirlwind (1^st Edition), 48-49, New Delhi: Penguin Books India

⁶ De Silva, K M, (1998), Reaping the Whirlwind (1^st Edition), 48-49, New Delhi: Penguin Books India

⁷ De Silva, K M, (1998), Reaping the Whirlwind (1^st Edition), 55, New Delhi: Penguin Books India

⁸ UN Charter, Chapter I, Article 1

⁹ UN General Assembly, (1965), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty- 1408th plenary meeting, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/2131.htm, Accessed on 29 June 2006.

¹⁰ Refer Appendix

 

Bibliography

1. De Silva, K M, (1998), Reaping the Whirlwind (1^st Edition), New Delhi: Penguin Books India

2. Goldstein, J (2004), International Relations (5th Edition), New Delhi: Pearson Education.

3. Griffiths, M, O’Callaghan, T, (2004), Key Concepts in International Relations (1st Edition), Chennai: Routledge

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